

Nuclear Security Initiative Logic Model

Strategies and 2015 targets

- a. **U.S. nuclear policy preparation:** Additional U.S. policymakers publicly acknowledge the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons to deal with key 21st century threats other than deterring nuclear use by others
- b. **U.S.-China:** Experts and officials understand each side's definition of strategic stability, and identify actions and programs that would be most destabilizing and therefore should be avoided
- c. **Communication and public engagement:** Increased support among the elite public for reduction in number of U.S. nuclear weapons and improved nonproliferation policies
- d. **U.S.-Russia:** Commit not to develop new nuclear weapons; avoid production and deployment of new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) delivery systems in both Russia and the U.S. that would be destabilizing; define operationally the requirements of strategic stability in ways that both accept; prepare for talks on reducing nuclear arsenals to 1,000 warheads each
- e. **U.S. executive branch:** Decision to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile below 1,000 and adjusted targeting requirements
- f. **U.S. legislature:** Does not appropriate additional funds to a new type of weapon or nuclear testing, nuclear-related policies get timely consideration
- g. **Umbrella states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Japan):** Develop confidence in regional security and deterrence that does not include nuclear weapons
- h. **NATO:** Develop confidence in European security with diminished reliance on nuclear weapons
- i. **P5:** New methods to ensure strategic stability; improved verification and compliance support reduced weapons

P5 reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in their defense policies

- a. **Turkey:** Does not acquire enrichment capabilities without genuine civilian need; continues public statements that it will not acquire nuclear weapons; takes constructive positions (e.g., supports Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol and supports a Middle East Nuclear-Free-Zone/NFZ) in nonproliferation forums such as NPT and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meetings
- b. **Brazil:** At NPT RevCon meetings and at the NSG, Brazil is supportive of one or more nonproliferation rules (e.g., increased IAEA safeguards, improved compliance and verification); only uses enrichment for purely civilian purposes; enunciates clearer, practical steps (e.g., that talks, not negotiations, with the P5 represent significant progress in fulfilling the Article VI commitment, or if reductions by the U.S. and Russia led to reductions by other nuclear-armed states) that nuclear-armed states could take that would be accepted as reinforcing the NPT disarmament bargain
- c. **Indonesia:** Provides leadership in key international disarmament debates such as the NPT's 2013 and 2014 PrepCon and 2015 RevCon using its ratification of CTBT to generate broad support of equitable and effective nonproliferation rules
- d. **The Non-Aligned Movement and the G77:** NAM/G77 is better understood by P5 policymakers, who can therefore engage more effectively with the NAM/G77 on non-proliferation and disarmament goals; is moving to support key nonproliferation policies such as improved compliance and verification, increased IAEA safeguards, or increased adoption of the Additional Protocol (or equivalent)
- e. **South Africa:** Becomes a strong voice in international dialogues (such as PrepCon and RevCon NPT meetings) around equitable and effective nonproliferation, bridging the gap between nonproliferation and disarmament
- f. **Egypt:** Reaffirms its intentions to remain a non-nuclear-weapon state; supports a Middle East NFZ; paces nuclear energy efforts to the development of suitable industrial and regulatory infrastructure and economic development
- g. **Other international:** Key swing countries (e.g., Malaysia, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia) pass domestic policies that set a good example and support effective nonproliferation
- h. **International Atomic Energy Agency:** Enhanced safeguards are well-justified, seen as credible, and Iran and Syria do not cause wider splits within the IAEA Board of Governors
- i. **U.N. work for a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone (MENWFZ):** Key nations develop a strategy to keep the idea moving forward
- j. **Kazakhstan and Ukraine:** Support nonproliferation at useful moments in the world dialogues

Non-nuclear emerging states commit to equitable and enforceable nonproliferation policies

Reduce the probability of a state or terrorist nuclear attack by roughly 10 percent *

- a. **Long-term policies for countries or utilities newly interested in nuclear power:** At least two countries (of U.A.E., Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan) establish safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant policies addressing fuel management, personnel, timelines, and funding of civilian nuclear power plants
- b. **Principles of conduct enforcement, funding, and implementation:** Adopters of the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters' Principles of Conduct agree on enforcement mechanisms and grievance procedures; nuclear power plant exporters transition to self-funding and self-management of the principles; banks and utilities enforce the principles
- c. **South Korea:** Affirms its stance as a non-nuclear-weapon state; continues to require the highest nonproliferation standards and policies in states to which it offers to export nuclear power plants; negotiates with the U.S. a new 123 agreement that does not include enrichment or reprocessing in South Korea by March 2014
- d. **Spent fuel waste management:** Multilateral discussions occur about the potential for spent fuel management in Asia and the Middle East
- e. **Nuclear trade:** Work with suppliers, utilities, and related government skill transfer agreements to improve nuclear trade
- f. **Safety:** Improved through national and international governance measures and effective regulation
- g. **International policy for multinational fuel facilities:** Agreement to cap new development of national fuel cycle facilities and multinationalize all existing facilities by 2030

Where nuclear power is being pursued, it is prudently developed to ensure security and safety of fissile material

* Out of a potential philanthropic contribution of around 30 percent

- a. **Few key actors:** Supported for important trips and meetings that will move the dialogues forward, primarily in Iran, but possibly in India/China, North Korea, and India/Pakistan, pursued opportunistically
- b. **Policy ideas for conflict states:** Results from others' studies on Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and India are translated into broader messages, used to educate policymakers, build consensus in the national and international debates, and define policy implications and implementable ideas
- c. **Civil society:** Promoted over time to have stronger nonproliferation voices
- d. **U.S. policies harmonized:** Between the nuclear policy world (e.g., nonproliferation policies) and the regional policy world (e.g., food aid)
- e. **International diplomacy and cooperative security:** Encouraged over military intervention

Reserve/other (potential conflict states* and terrorism)**

Black: actively pursue
Purple: others focus here, pursue if landscape changes
Red: do not pursue/lower immediate opportunity

** If there is a negotiated solution with Iran before 2020 this outcome will no longer be applicable
*** Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and India